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Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities 
Harrison Fell, Ian A. MacKenzie, and William A. Pizer  
Abstract 
Welfare comparisons of regulatory instruments under uncertainty, even in dynamic analyses, 
have typically focused on price versus quantity controls despite the presence of banking and borrowing 
provisions in existing emissions trading programs. This is true even in the presence of banking and 
borrowing provisions in existing emissions trading programs. Nonetheless, many have argued that such 
provisions can reduce price volatility and lower costs in the face of uncertainty, despite any theoretical or 
empirical evidence. This paper develops a model and solves for optimal banking and borrowing behavior 
with uncertain cost shocks that are serially correlated. We show that while banking does reduce price 
volatility and lowers costs, the degree of these reductions depends on the persistence of shocks. For 
plausible parameter values related to U.S. climate change policy, we find that bankable quantities 
eliminate about 20 percent of the cost difference between price and nonbankable quantities.  
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Prices versus Quantities versus Bankable Quantities 
Harrison Fell, Ian A. MacKenzie, and William A. Pizer∗ 
Introduction 
Under the presence of uncertainty, welfare comparisons of regulatory instruments have 
typically focused on price versus quantity instruments (Weitzman 1974; Roberts and Spence 
1976; Hoel and Karp 2001; Newell and Pizer 2003). Neglected by this debate is an increasingly 
common trend in which regulators allow quantities to be banked and/or borrowed throughout 
time—where the regulated quantity can either be saved for future use or borrowed from future 
periods, respectively. This is true for the majority of tradable permit markets, such as the federal 
SO2 and NOx trading programs in the United States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
program for CO2 in the northeast United States, the CO2 Emissions Trading Scheme in the 
European Union and, in a broader context, the Kyoto Protocol.1 Yet, although bankable quantity 
regulation is becoming increasingly common, there is still an inadequate understanding of how 
firm behavior responds to banking opportunities in the presence of uncertainty and, in turn, how 
this bankable quantity regulation compares to both ordinary quantity and price controls in terms 
of expected welfare. 
This paper presents a model of optimal behavior with a quantitative emissions limit, the 
flexibility to bank allowances, and uncertainty about costs. We then use this modeled behavior to 
examine the welfare implications for price, quantity, and bankable quantity regulatory choices. 
We find bankable quantity regulation improves welfare over a nonbankable system but does not 
achieve welfare improvements over a price policy. We also find the equilibrium bank chosen by 
firms is relatively small and positive where persistent (and correlated) baseline emissions shocks 
have the potential to raise costs and maintain price volatility (even in the presence of an initially 
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http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php (article 3, paragraph 13) for information on 
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large bank). Further, allowing for either permit borrowing or abatement and marginal cost 
growth improves expected welfare compared to the banking-only case. 
In our analysis we extend the scope of the well-known price versus quantity dichotomy 
first initiated by Weitzman (1974). Weitzman (1974) was able to show that differences in the 
relative efficiency between price and quantity controls were a result of the marginal benefit and 
cost slopes as well as the degree of uncertainty. This framework has been extended by Hoel and 
Karp (2001, 2002) and Newell and Pizer (2003) to consider stock externalities (pollutants) 
accumulating over time; they find price policies tend to produce larger net benefits than quantity 
controls. Yet, with respect to the problem of climate change, the political difficulties of 
implementing price policies have resulted in a greater emphasis on quantity controls. As a result, 
recent studies such as Pizer (1999, 2002) and Newell et al. (2005) have begun to focus on how 
existing quantity regulations can be reconciled to efficient price policies. Using “safety valves” 
or “trigger” prices for quantities appears to be an option as they allow a ceiling on the price of 
the quantity. However, the distinction between price and quantity regulation has yet to consider 
the welfare implications of bankable quantities. 
The motivation for including banking and borrowing provisions in quantity regulation 
reflects an extension of the fundamental idea behind tradable permit markets. The idea of 
tradable permit markets allows a regulator to allocate pollution rights to firms where the rights 
are freely traded. As a consequence of competitive trading, abatement effort among regulated 
firms is efficiently distributed (Montgomery 1972). Additionally, allowing firms the option of 
exchanging permits between different time periods further reduces social costs by allowing 
abatement choices to be efficiently distributed between different time periods (Cronshaw and 
Kruse 1996; Rubin 1996; Kling and Rubin 1997; Leiby and Rubin 2001).  
Another commonly discussed justification for allowing banking and borrowing 
provisions is the ability of firms’ permit inventories to dampen the consequences of unexpected 
shocks and reduce price volatility within the market. Indeed, the intertemporal reallocation of 
permits may improve production scheduling and allow for speculation or hedging against 
possible price movements [for similar inventory models see Williams and Wright (1991) and 
Blinder and Maccini (1991)]. Godby et al. (1997) developed an experiment to consider the 
consequences of permit banking and found, in the presence of uncertainty, that banking improves 
permit price stability. Also, Jacoby and Ellerman (2004) and Ellerman (2005) suggested that 
tradable permit programs that allow banking significantly reduce price volatility compared to 
nonbanking schemes. Despite these discussions, until now there has been little theoretical or 
empirical analysis of such stabilizing potential. Our modeling results, while lending some Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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credibility to these claims, show that price volatility may still be a problem even in the presence 
of banking (and borrowing). When shocks to the market are correlated and persistent, the value 
of banking is diminished because—in the limit—shocks verge on being permanent and not 
amenable to stabilization. 
An initial attempt at investigating banking and uncertainty is given by Schennach (2000), 
who identified the expected price and emissions paths for the U.S. SO2 market. However, this 
study does not focus on the incentives behind optimal banking behavior under the presence of 
uncertainty, steady state behavior, or welfare. Recently Feng and Zhao (2006) considered 
alternative structures of permit markets with uncertain abatement costs and the possibility to 
bank and borrow permits. In a two-period model, they found that whether a banking regime is 
welfare improving compared to nonbanking regime depends on the extent of asymmetric 
information. When firms know more about current abatement shocks than the regulator, banking 
can be welfare improving; however, as the level of asymmetry is decreased, the gains in banking 
similarly reduce, and emissions uncertainty has no effect on welfare. In their treatment of 
bankable quantities, Feng and Zhao (2006) do not make comparisons between price, quantities, 
and bankable quantities and simply focus on the case of banking and no-banking regimes. 
Furthermore, as the model is restricted to only two periods, only small inferences can be made 
about the correlation and persistence in shocks through time—something that turns out to have a 
significant impact on banking behavior and welfare.  
For our benchmark analysis, we create an infinite-period tradable permit market in which 
the “representative” firm is allowed to bank allowances in each period. We consider costs and 
benefits associated with cumulative emissions reductions as in Newell and Pizer (2003). By 
using discrete dynamic programming, we establish a value function for a single representative 
firm. In each period the firm, in order to maximize the net present discounted value of negative 
costs, simultaneously chooses a level of emissions to pollute and a level of permits to bank. In 
our model, the bank chosen in the current period equals the previous period’s bank, plus the 
current-period allocation, minus the choice of current-period emissions. Uncertainty in emissions 
is modeled by the inclusion of a stochastic shock in the current period that either increases or 
decreases the firm’s baseline level of emissions and, as a result, may alter the cost of abatement. 
Further, the benchmark model is extended to cases where (i) firms have ability to borrow permits 
from future compliance periods and (ii) where there is abatement and marginal cost growth. 
Our numerical simulation, which uses realistic parameters for U.S. climate policy, shows 
that under the presence of uncertainty an incentive exists, on average, to bank permits in each 
period. We find that a larger initial positive bank and more favorable baseline emissions shocks Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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lower the net present value of expected costs.2  Relative to Schennach (2000) we show that, even 
with an initial bank of zero and no shock, an incentive to bank permits exists. When firms hold a 
zero initial bank, there is an expectation that the bank will grow; for larger bank values, the 
expectation is that the bank will decline—this defines a stable equilibrium bank. Lower 
correlation among shocks and a lower discount rate also tend to increase banking behavior. That 
is, when shocks are highly correlated firms add to their banks more slowly in favorable shock 
periods and draw their banks down more slowly in unfavorable shock periods compared to the 
case when shocks exhibit low serial correlation. This is analogous to the permanent income 
hypothesis result: a more persistent shock to income induces less savings than an idiosyncratic 
shock (Friedman 1957). Bankable quantities, although welfare improving on nonbankable 
qualities, generally achieve less than half the cost improvements associated with a price policy. 
The main reason for the lower expected welfare is due to the persistent shocks that encourage 
deviations from average prices and raise costs. Furthermore, due to the persistence of shocks 
throughout time, price volatility may continue to pose a problem; although a large positive bank 
will dampen price movements, there is a tendency for firms to draw down the bank and, as a 
result, price volatility continues. Similar findings occur when permits can additionally be 
borrowed, yet the net present value of costs tends to be smaller than those experienced in the 
banking-only case. Finally, we also show that a model with growth can be transformed into a 
solvable stationary model, analogous to the Ramsey (1928) growth model. We find allowing for 
growth produces larger expected welfare gains compared to the banking-only case. 
Our contribution to the literature is thus twofold. To date, research has either investigated 
the simple price versus quantity dichotomy as a form of regulation or has attempted to reconcile 
quantity regulation with supplementary mechanisms to obtain results similar to that of price 
policy. However, we are able to investigate the welfare consequences of price, quantity, and 
bankable quantities. Although our main focus is on climate change policy, our model can be used 
to compare the welfare of regulating stock externalities through a price, quantity, or bankable 
quantity control instrument. Furthermore, we are able to provide insights into the incentives of 
                                                 
2 To the extent that we are primarily concerned with cumulative emissions (as is the case with CO2) or that early 
reductions are preferred to later reductions (as is the case with relatively constant marginal emissions consequences, 
as arises with SO2 and NOx), these reduced costs are not associated with any reduction in benefits (and, in fact, 
might yield higher benefits). 
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firms when they select a level of bankable quantities; given this, we also show the potential for 
sustained price volatility under the presence of uncertainty in a tradable permit market. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the underlying cost–benefit model 
and reviews previous welfare results for prices and nonbankable quantities. Section 3 develops 
the banking model and derives results for the case with growth. Section 4 introduces the 
numerical analysis. Section 5 discusses the policy implications and Section 6 concludes.  
Model and Previous Results 
Our underlying model is based on Newell and Pizer (2003), hereafter NP, who compared 
the welfare consequences of price and (nonbankable) quantity controls for the case of a stock 
externality. They consider a “representative” firm responding to alternate price or quantity 
controls set by a regulator where shocks are observed by the firm (but not by the regulator). 




, t t t
t
t t t q q
c
q C θ θ − − =  
where qt  is the quantity of emissions,  t q is the average cost-minimizing level of emissions in the 
absence of regulation (i.e., the baseline emissions level), ct is the slope of marginal costs, and θt 
is a baseline emissions shock to the cost-minimizing emissions level.3  Potential changes in ct 
and  t q  allow for cost reductions and growth in uncontrolled emissions. The cost shock has an 
autoregressive form  t t t ε ρθ θ + = −1  with correlation 1 ≤ ρ  and mean zero error
2 ()~( 0 , ) t ε ε σ . 
We assume costs are convex (ct > 0) so that costs are minimized at  t t q θ +  (ignoring the potential 
benefits). Any reduction in emissions below this level leads to increasing costs at an increasing 
rate. 
Also, following the approach of NP, we allow for emissions to accumulate in the 
environment:  
1 (1 ) tt t SS q δ − =− + 
                                                 
3 NP, in turn following Weitzman (1974), specify θt as a shock to marginal costs; the only difference is a scaling 
factor ct. If ct is unchanging, there is no consequence; however, if we allow ct to change and assume the distribution 
of θt is time invariant, we are choosing between a shock whose distribution remains invariant in $/ton (NP) versus 
constant in tons (here). We choose the latter because it will allow us to solve the problem with growth. Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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where St is the accumulated stock of emissions at time t, which accumulates with decay rate δ. 
The decay rate can take on values representing cases ranging from a “pure stock externality” that 
persists forever (δ = 1) to a “flow externality” (δ = 0) that replicates the traditionally analyzed 
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where  t S  represents a benefit-maximizing level of the stock (possibly zero, possibly a 
background level), and bt ≥ 0. 
NP use this model to derive the welfare difference between optimal price and quantity 


























r is the interest rate, and Ωρ,t captures the correlation of shocks today with previous shocks and, 
under a price policy, deviations from the expected level of the accumulated pollution stock. Note 
that when the decay rate equals 1, these two Ω terms equal 1, and the expression reduces to the 
original Weitzman (1974) expression for comparing price and quantity controls. Summing this Δt 
expression over time, for example,  ( ) ∑ Δ +
−
t t
t r 1 , we can estimate the net present value of using 
price versus quantity controls over many periods. 
It is useful to note that (1) can be decomposed into two effects associated with prices: a 
decrease in expected costs given by  ( )




2 2 t t t t c b ρ δ σ Ω Ω . Applied to climate change, the effect on benefits is sufficiently small to be 
negligible because bt Ωδ Ωρ,t is small relative to ct (NP). This would suggest that welfare 
analyses of bankable quantities applied to climate change could similarly neglect the benefits. 
However, even if this term were not negligible, banking—to the extent that it introduces 
variability in emissions relative to nonbankable quantities—does not diminish benefits because 
in all cases emissions reductions occur earlier than required when banking is not allowed. For 
that reason, while the benefit–loss term is relevant for comparing quantity and price controls 
(where variability will diminish benefits), our discussion of the welfare effects of bankable Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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quantities versus prices and quantities can neglect the benefit term and leave, at worst, a 
conservative estimate of the bankable quantity advantage. 
The Banking Problem 
We retreat from the optimal price and quantity discussion in NP to consider, for a 
moment, the banking problem facing the representative firm. Ordinary price and quantity 
controls pose a relatively simple behavioral problem for the regulator to understand. In the case 
of quantity controls, there is the challenge of choosing the optimal quantity, but the regulated 
firm actually faces no choice: it simply emits the regulated volume of emissions (technically, the 
firm could choose to emit less but, given positive marginal costs of abatement and no financial 
benefit to emitting less than the given quantity, it would never choose to do so). In the case of 
price controls, the firm matches marginal cost to the regulated price each period; for a model 
with linear marginal costs, this is a trivial problem. 
The opportunity to bank (borrow) poses a trickier challenge to understanding the firm’s 
behavior. As before, the firm faces the quadratic cost function given above where the firm is 
given a set emissions allocation each period, which we now label yt to distinguish from actual 
emissions. Unlike the no-banking regulation, where the firm would always choose qt = yt, the 
firm now has the flexibility of choosing emissions qt anywhere between 0 and yt + Bt, where Bt is 
the start-of-period bank, and where any excess emissions allocation can be saved for the next 
period. In the most general case, this choice of emissions results in a bank at the beginning of the 
next period equal to  
  ( ) 1 tt t t t B RB y q + =+ −  (2) 
where Rt is a trading ratio between periods. In other words, the bank for the future period must 
equal the current bank with the addition of the initial allocation minus the choice of current-
period emissions, all multiplied by the trading ratio between periods. 4  
We can now write the firm’s optimization problem as 
  () () ( )
2
11 1 ,m a x ,
2 t
t
tt t t t t tt t t q
c
VB q q EV B θθ β θ ++ +
⎧ ⎫ =−− − + ⎡ ⎤ ⎨ ⎬ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭
 (3) 
                                                 
4 Trading ratios are typically set to one if the bank is positive and greater than one if the bank is negative. For 
instance, the trading ratio is 1.1 for borrowed permits in the proposed climate change bill S. 2191 (Lieberman–
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subject to (2). We have defined Vt(Bt,θt) recursively as the negative expected net present of costs 
in period t, conditional on the current bank Bt and baseline emissions shock θt, and assuming 
optimal behavior in every future period. This is a value function. To the extent there is a final 
period, (1) can be solved backward from the final period. If we want to consider an infinite 
horizon, however, we need to further specify the model to eliminate the time dependence of the 
value function. A simple approach would be to make ct,  t q , yt, and R time invariant, removing 
the time dependency and simplifying (3) to  
  () ()( )
2
11 ,m a x ,
2 t
tt t t t t t q
c
VB q q EVB θθ β θ ++
⎧ ⎫ = − − −+⎡ ⎤ ⎨ ⎬ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭
 (4) 
 subject to (2).  
Alternatively, suppose we assume that the marginal cost slope ct grows at constant rate gc 
and the required abatement absent from banking,  t t y q − , grows at constant rate ga. Let R be time 
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where Δqt  = qt – yt is the new choice variable. This suggests redefining the bank Bt, choice 
variable Δqt, and shock θt in terms relative to the required abatement each period, absent from 
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and we can then rewrite the value function as 
  () () ()( )
2 2 0
00 11 ,m a x 1 ,
2 t
tt t t t t t q
c
VB y q q EVB θθ β θ ++ Δ
⎧⎫ ⎡ ⎤ =−− + Δ − + ⎨⎬ ⎣ ⎦ ⎩⎭

      (5) 
with  () 1 tt t B RB q + =− Δ    and  () a g R R + = 1
~
. 
It is useful to note that  () 2
~ 2
0 0 0 q y c
t − β  equals the net present value of costs each period 
under price regulation designed to yield emissions equal to yt on average. Similarly, 
                                                 
5 This is similar to rewriting variables in the Ramsey (1928) growth model relative to labor or labor and total factor 






t cy q E βθ ⎡⎤ −+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
  equals the net present value of costs each period under quantity 
regulation without banking. To the extent that banking allows  t q ~ Δ  to approach  t θ
~
, expected 
costs with banking will be reduced toward expected costs under price regulation. 
Numerical Analysis 
The recursive equations (4) and (5) must be solved numerically. In order to do this, we 
make a discretized approximation of the problem. Our programmed approach creates a 101 × 
101 grid of discrete values for the bank and cost shock. Each iteration starts with the preceding 
guess of the value function defined over this grid. That value function is used to create the next-
period expected value function in terms of the next-period bank and this-period shock.6  We then 
loop over all grid values for the current-period shock and bank, and numerically solve (4) and (5) 
by using the given current-period cost function, this next-period expected value function, and the 
accumulation rule for the bank. This gives us a new estimate of the value function. To help 
improve convergence, our next guess is a weighted average of the previous guess and this new 
estimate.7  
Our work focuses on parameter values meant to inform the debate over the design of U.S. 
climate policy—in particular, whether banking significantly reduces price volatility and expected 
costs relative to a no-banking case as well as a price policy. Our benchmark case is the no-
growth model given in (4) with banking only (i.e., no borrowing). Based on recent estimates of 
U.S. compliance costs with S. 2191 (Lieberman–Warner), we assume  7 . 6 = q billion tons and y 
= 5.7 billion tons (about a 15 percent reduction) with a marginal cost of $30/ton CO2 (EPA 
2008). This implies c0 = $30 per ton per billion tons, or $3 × 10
–8 $/ton
2. We assume the standard 
deviation of the independently and identically distributed quantity shock is 1/3 billion tons 
(equivalent deviation of the marginal cost shock is $10/ton). Based on NP, we assume an 
autocorrelation of 0.8 (which implies a long-term standard deviation of θ of about 5/9 billion 
tons or $16/ton). Finally, we assume a discount factor of 0.95 and a uniform trading ratio R. 
Table 1 summarizes the “benchmark” parameter values. 
                                                 
6 For example, if shocks are uncorrelated, the next period expected value function will have the same value for any 
current period shock. 
7 This technique is sometimes referred to as overrelaxation when the weight on the new estimate is greater than one 
(and the old guess has a negative weight). See Wilmott et al. (1995) for more details. Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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The primary output of the numerical effort is the value function, defined over the bank 
value Bt and level of the baseline emissions shock θt. The negative of the value function defined 
in (4), that is, the net present value of costs resulting from our numerical optimization, is 
depicted in Figure 1. Costs are a positive function of the shock [which raises costs in (4)] and a 
negative function of the bank (which initially represents a weakening of the constraint). 
Recalling that the first-period standard deviation of the cost shock is 1/3 billion tons, the figure 
shows costs up to ±5 standard deviations (±3 standard deviations of the long-run cost shock with 
autocorrelation of 0.8). The bank reflects a potential accumulation equal to four times the annual 
abatement level of 1 billion tons (while borrowing is limited to 1 billion tons). Thus, the potential 
bank covers 15 standard deviations of the short-run cost shock (9 standard deviations of the long-
run cost shock). 
A more useful way to view the value function for the purpose of welfare comparisons 
among instruments is to take expectations of the net present value costs in Figure 1 over the first-
period cost shock (applying a mean zero, 1/3 billion ton standard deviation, normal distribution 
to the baseline emissions shock in Figure 1) and then to consider the value associated with an 
initial bank of zero (e.g., zero value along the banking axis). This is what we would expect the 
program to cost before knowing the initial shock and assuming any bank must be acquired by 
emissions reductions in excess of the annual cap. Figure 2 shows the result of taking this 
expectation over the cost shock.  With an initial bank of zero tons, the expected net present value 
of costs is $369 billion. 
We can compare these expected costs to those under a tax or nonbankable permit policy. 




t cy q E βθ ⎡ ⎤ −+ ⎣ ⎦  in each 
period. For our infinite horizon no-growth model with parameter values given in Table 1, the net 




tcy q β −  each period, the net present value of costs equals $300 billion. These 
calculations are summarized along with sensitivity analysis for the discount factor β and 
correlation ρ in Table 2. Cost comparisons for the growth case, (5), and a system that allows 
borrowing as well as banking are also included in Table 2. The main conclusion from this table is 
that bankable quantities generally achieve less than half the cost improvement associated with a 
tax policy.  
As noted earlier, the effect on benefits of a mean-preserving change in emissions is 
negligible compared to costs in the climate example because the slope of marginal benefits is so 
much flatter. Further, banking serves to move emissions reductions from the future to the present Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
11 
(and emissions from the present to the future) thereby, if anything, increasing benefits relative to 
fixed emissions constraints. For both of these reasons, the cost effects in Table 2 can also be 
viewed as preliminary welfare comparisons. 
Looking in more detail, we see that bankable quantities achieve slightly less than one-
fifth the cost improvement associated with price policies for the benchmark parameters. This 
jumps to roughly one-quarter with lower discount rates and considerably higher—over 40 
percent—without correlation. Intuitively, lower discount rates make the future more important 
(after a precautionary bank is developed and welfare can be improved). Lower correlation is a 
different story. When correlation is high, banking in low-cost states does not pay off as much, in 
terms of using the bank to cover a future high-cost period, because low-cost states tend to be 
followed by more low-cost states. Similarly, the bank is drawn down more slowly in the high-
cost states when shock correlation is high because of the expectation of persistent high costs. 
With no correlation, banking in a low-cost state has a 50-50 chance of paying off next period, 
and thus banking activity (adding to and drawing down the bank) increases with decreased shock 
correlation. This more aggressive use of the bank with no shock correlation drives the result that 
the cost savings of moving from a no-banking system to a system that allows banking is greater 
as the correlation declines. 
In the case where borrowing is permitted, we assume that borrowed permits must be paid 
with 10 percent interest. 8 This alters the trading ratio in the banking state equation, (2), such that 










Additionally, we assumed that borrowing in any period is limited to one billion tons. As shown 
in Table 2, allowing both banking and borrowing, even with a trading ratio greater than unity for 
borrowed permits, further reduces the net present value of costs compared to the case of banking 
only. However, for our parameter assumptions, the cost savings from adding borrowing 
provisions to a system with banking are quite minimal. The cost savings from allowing 
borrowing do increase as the trading ratio for borrowed permits approaches unity and as the 
borrowing limit is relaxed. 
                                                 
8 This borrowing interest rate is consistent with S. 2191. Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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For the growth specification, (5), we assume, as in NP, that the slope of marginal cost 
declines at a rate of 2.5 percent (gc = –0.025) and that annual abatement grows at a rate of 3.5 
percent (ga = 0.035).9  As can be seen in Table 2, the growth assumption dramatically increases 
the net present value of costs for all regulation forms compared to the no-growth scenarios. 
Allowing banking in the growth case achieves about one-third the cost improvement associated 
with price policies for the benchmark parameters. The gain from banking on a percentage basis is 
roughly double compared to that of the no-growth case. Intuitively, allowing growth in the model 
increases the discount factor compared to the benchmark, which increases the importance of 
future periods (this is similar to a reduction in the discount rate). 
Distinct from welfare and expected costs, one of the particular appeals of price 
mechanisms is their predictable economic impact in terms of price effects. Proponents of 
borrowing, in particular, often argue that with sufficient intertemporal flexibility, short-term 
price fluctuations will be substantially reduced or could even vanish. Therefore, it is useful to 
look at how banking affects price variability. Figure 3 shows the mean price for various levels of 
the bank, along with 2.5 percent and 97.5 percent quantiles, based on the initial shock 
distribution.10  Note that the 95 percent confidence interval (CI) for baseline emissions shocks 
without banking would be from $10 to $50 per ton CO2, with a mean of $30 (e.g., a standard 
deviation of $10 as shown in Table 1) . With no bank, banking does not help with adverse 
shocks: the 97.5 percent quantile is still $50. However, as the bank builds, the upper range drops 
to $40. Another interesting observation is that even with a large bank of 2 to 3 billion tons—
several times the annual abatement requirement—prices still have a 95 percent prediction 
interval of about one-third of the original no-banking case. In the case where correlation is set to 
zero (not shown here), this range associated with a large bank drops to about one-tenth of the no-
banking case. 
                                                 
9 Assuming a growth in baseline emissions of 0.6 percent annually, an annual abatement growth rate of 3.5 percent 
will approximately halve current baseline emissions levels in 50 years. This is roughly in line with S. 2191, which 
calls for a 65 percent reduction in current emissions levels by 2050.  
10 Note this is different from the long-term steady state distribution, but is useful for understanding likely short-term 
price fluctuations. Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
13 
Steady State 
We now turn briefly to the steady state. While useful for understanding the model 
behavior, it is probably less informative for real policy comparison as it focuses entirely on the 
extrapolated future rather than the path beginning with the present. The steady state analyses 
conducted here are for a system with banking only and for a system that allows both banking and 
borrowing. Both cases are based on no-growth (4). In our steady state simulations (Figures 4, 5, 
6, and 7), we find that equilibrium-expected bank levels and prices are highly dependent on the 
level of persistence in the baseline emissions shocks.11 From Figure 5, we see that the expected 
bank level and 95 percent CIs of the bank increase as shock correlation increases, which is not 





− ρ . For a 
system with both banking and borrowing, when baseline emissions shocks are less persistent, 
bank levels fluctuate between positive and negative values more from period to period. This 
creates a steady state bank time-path that is centered around a zero mean. However, as 
persistence in the shocks increases, the steady state bank levels drift (more persistently) from 
zero. This leads to greater variation in the bank. Also, since the maximum allowable positive 
bank level is greater than the maximum allowable borrowing level, persistent shocks will force 
the bank to drift farther away from zero on the positive side than on the negative side, resulting 
in an increasing expected bank level as persistence in the shocks increases. The story is similar 
for policies that allow banking only except that Bt ≥ 0 for all t, and thus the expected steady state 
bank levels for any given value of ρ are larger than those in a banking–borrowing system. 
From Figure 6, we see that, regardless of shock persistence, the expected permit price in a 
banking-only policy is simply the expected marginal cost of abatement, $30/ton. This means that 
on average yt = qt, just as it would in a no-banking system. However, an interesting result, 
readily observable in Figure 7, is that when borrowing is allowed the expected steady state prices 
are slightly above the $30 no-growth marginal cost level. This means that on average, qt < yt, 
which seems to suggest an ever-increasing bank. However, this steady state feature is a result of 
a trading ratio being greater than unity in borrowing states. Since firms have to pay back more 
than they borrowed, firms will emit less than their allocation to cover their borrowing interest, 
resulting, on average, in qt < yt. Both Figure 6 and Figure 7 also show that the variability in the 
                                                 
11 With the exception of ρ, the results presented in Figures 4 through 7 are based on benchmark parameter values 
and R = 1.1 when permits are borrowed. Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
14 
price increases considerably as shock persistence increases. This result is, again, due to the fact 
that firms more actively use the bank, in terms of adding to or drawing from the bank in any 
given period, as shock persistence decreases. Because firms use the bank less actively with 
highly persistent baseline emissions shocks, the marginal abatement costs, and hence prices, will 
more fully reflect the baseline emissions shocks just as they would under no banking. This 
directly leads to greater steady state price variability as shock persistence increases.  
Comparing the steady state price variability based on the CIs, the banking-only system 
appears to have less variability for any given ρ value than the banking–borrowing system. This 
points to another interesting observation. As shown in Figure 3, expected permit prices increase 
as bank levels decrease. Looking at the steady state bank levels in Figures 5 and 6, we see that 
the system with banking and borrowing produces an upper bound bank level slightly below that 
of a banking-only system. Since permitting borrowing lowers the expected permit price for every 
bank state compared with a banking-only system and there is only a slight difference in the upper 
bound steady state bank levels between the banking and banking–borrowing cases, the lower 
bound steady state permit price is roughly equal for both the banking-only and banking–
borrowing cases. However, for the banking–borrowing case the lower bound of the steady state 
bank is significantly below that of the banking-only case. This forces the upper bound of the 
steady state permit price to be much higher in the banking–borrowing case compared to that in 
the banking-only case. So, while allowing borrowing lowers expected costs, it does not reduce 
steady state price variability compared to a banking-only system. In fact, our model shows that 
the increased variability associated with a banking–borrowing system can be quite substantial as 
the persistence of the shocks increases.   
Discussion 
These results suggest that bankable quantities help out in terms of expected welfare and 
reducing price volatility, but perhaps not as much as proponents might suggest. Costs and 
welfare are improved by about one-fifth of the difference between price and nonbankable 
quantity regulations.12  More importantly, there is no protection against adverse costs in the 
initial period, as evidenced by the “zero-bank” results in Figure 3. 
                                                 
12 Note that the infinite horizon expected price/nonbankable quantity welfare difference of $185 billion is about five 
times the 40-year estimate reported in Newell and Pizer (2003). This is a result of a higher benchmark price in the 
current estimates (as well as the longer, infinite, horizon). Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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This suggests two possible policy modifications: some mechanism to create an initial 
bank as well as a possible safety valve mechanism (Pizer 2002). The effect of an initial bank is 
relatively easy to see. A small bank equal to the equilibrium bank can be introduced without 
changing the expected emissions level over time (because the effect of banking, in general, is to 
lower expected emissions initially, as the bank is acquired). While it is still possible that over 
time the market will wander toward a zero bank and large price shocks, the likelihood of these 
events is the product of both wandering toward a zero bank and having an adverse shock, which 
is less likely than the singular probability of having an adverse shock when we know the bank is 
zero.  
Alternatively, one could introduce a large initial bank—say equal to twice the annual 
abatement requirement, or about 2 billion tons, as suggested at the end of the last section. This 
would initially depress the price to $20 (with consequently higher average emissions), but the 
range of prices would be cut by more than half. As the bank is drained, the price would again 
wander up toward the higher range. This is, in many ways, analogous to what happened in the 
SO2 market shown in Figure 8. Under that program, overcompliance in the initial phase yielded a 
bank roughly equal to the annual emissions level. This bank was slowly being drawn down until 
2004, when the policy was reformed with tighter targets beginning in 2010—leading to higher 
prices and renewed banking. 
Evidence to suggest that prices continue to fluctuate even with a large bank can be found 
in the history of SO2 prices themselves, which wandered between $100–$200 per ton over the 
first decade of the program. This is consistent with our observation that as long as shocks are 
correlated and persistent, prices will continue to fluctuate even with a large bank. Given the large 
bank, the market also witnessed even more significant price escalation in 2004–2005 as the new 
reforms were proceeding through the regulatory process. The price rose to more than $1,500 
before settling down to around $600.  
We should also note that proposals to allow borrowing are, for many intents and 
purposes, equivalent to introducing an initial bank.13  For a large enough borrowing limit, we 
would expect an equilibrium with a nonzero expected debt. 
                                                 
13 The one difference is a proposed difference in the rate of interest on negative balances (borrowing) versus 
positive balances (banking). Most proposals suggest interest on borrowing, but none on banking. Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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All of this suggests another kind of policy might be useful: a safety valve whereby the 
government sells additional allowances at a fixed price. While Pizer (2002) finds the “optimal” 
safety valve policy would be to turn the quantity control into a price policy by setting the safety 
valve price equal to the expected price, he also finds that a high safety valve also significantly 
raises welfare relative to no safety valve. Here, it might make sense to include a high-price safety 
valve to address the risk of an initially high price level before any bank development. 
A final point is to note recent proposals for a “reserve” rather than an unlimited safety 
valve (Murray et al. 2008).14  That is, the government would sell up to a fixed reserve amount 
into the market when the price exceeded a given threshold. Given that a relatively small volume 
of permits is necessary to reduce prices, the use of an unlimited safety valve is unnecessary. A 
limit also has the potential to appeal to a broader audience of stakeholders, many of whom are 
highly focused on the emissions outcome. 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
Comparing price and quantity instruments has long provided a basic framework to 
analyze efficient regulatory controls. However, it is also possible for quantities to be banked and 
borrowed throughout time. For example, the ability to overcomply with a tradable permit system 
and bank unused allowances for future use is a central part of most observed emissions trading 
systems. What has been less well understood is the ability of banking to provide insurance 
against unexpected high-cost outcomes. Despite significant claims about this potential feature, 
there has been little analysis of how firms ought to behave in the face of uncertain costs and the 
opportunity to bank. Therefore, given the presence of uncertainty, it is the aim of this paper to 
investigate firms’ behavior under bankable quantity regulation and then compare this to both 
price and quantity regulation in terms of expected welfare. 
This paper has developed a relatively straightforward model of a representative firm’s 
period-to-period decision to bank allowances under uncertainty. Solving the model numerically 
for parameters relevant for U.S. climate policy, we have made several observations. First, 
banking does improve welfare versus a nonbankable system, but does not achieve even half the 
benefits associated with a price policy. This arises primarily because of the persistence in 
baseline emissions shocks. Additional improvements in expected welfare also occur when 
                                                 
14 See www.rff.org/costscontainment. Resources for the Future  Fell, MacKenzie, and Pizer 
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borrowing and growth are taken into consideration. Second, there is still considerable price 
volatility: to the extent proponents expect banking to substantially dampen high prices, this does 
not appear to be the case. A large initial bank dampens prices more—although a large bank does 
not appear to be sustainable as it is desirable to draw it down. Borrowing provisions can be 
expected to behave similarly to a large initial bank. This suggests there may still be motivation 
for considering price mechanisms in addition to banking. 
These preliminary results raise many questions, some of which we have already 
identified. In particular, what might motivate a larger bank? Both the SO2 and NOx programs 
have larger banks than would seem to be suggested by other features. Suppose marginal costs are 
nonlinear, with marginal costs rising faster for adverse shocks than falling for favorable ones. Or 
suppose there is some probability of transition to a new regulatory state—either tighter controls 
(as in the SO2 program) or confiscation of the existing bank (as in the NOx program). Finally, our 
approach to including growth, which is itself completely preliminary, may be inadequate to 
capture important features. By solving for a future steady state with a finite-horizon transition, 
we should be able to capture additional features. All of these are avenues we plan to pursue. 
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    Table 1. Parameter Values for Benchmark Solution of Banking Problem 
Description Parameter  Value 
Slope of marginal costs  c0  $30/ton per billion tons 
Annual baseline emissions  q   6.7 billion tons 
Annual cap  y  5.7 billion tons 
Initial s.e. of emissions   σ  0.33 billion tons 
      (converted to cost s.e.)    $10/ ton 
Correlation of shocks  ρ  0.8 
Long-run s.e. of emissions 
2 1 σ ρ −   0.55 billion tons 
      (converted to cost s.e.)    $17/ton 
Discount factor  β  0.95 
Trading ratio  R  1 
Table 2. Net Present Value of Costs (dollars in billions) 
Case
*  Tax  Quantities  Bankable Q  Banking Gain 
Benchmark $300  $385  $371  16% 
Low discounting  $600  $777  $730  27% 
No correlation  $300  $333  $318  45% 
Low discounting 
+ no correlation 
$600 $667  $627  60% 
Borrowing




$1,929 $2,516  $2,325  33% 
 
Notes: 
*Benchmark parameter values given in Table 1. Low discounting sets β = 0.975. No correlation sets ρ = 0.0. 
          
**For the borrowing case, R = 1.1 when permits are borrowed (Bt < 0) and R = 1 otherwise (Bt ≥ 0). 





Figure 1. Value Function Based on Benchmark Parameter Values 
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Figure 2. Value Function Averaged Over First-Period Shock Distribution 
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Figure 3. Mean Price and 95% CI Using Benchmark Parameters 
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Figure 4. Steady State Expected Bank and 95% CIs with Banking Only 
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Figure 5. Steady State Expected Bank and 95% CIs with Banking and Borrowing  
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Figure 6. Steady State Expected Prices and 95% CIs with Banking Only 
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Figure 8. SO2 Program, Current Vintage Price  
 
 